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WHAT DOES PUERTO RICAN CITIZENSHIP 
MEAN FOR PUERTO RICO’S LEGAL STATUS? 
JOSEPH BLOCHER & MITU GULATI† 
“There are 3.7 million American citizens living in Puerto Rico. As 
citizens, they should be entitled to determine for themselves their 
political status.”1  
– President Donald Trump 
In Race and Representation Revisited: The New Racial 
Gerrymandering Cases and Section 2 of the VRA, Guy-Uriel Charles 
and Luis Fuentes-Rohwer explore the Voting Rights Act in a novel 
way.2 They focus on the aspects of the Act that, from the beginning, 
made it vulnerable to “exit,” and eventually led to the “judicially 
enforced exit” that manifested in Shelby County v. Holder.3 This theme 
of cross-branch exit appears in many of the other contributions to this 
symposium, from Curt Bradley’s focus on executive-led exit from 
treaties4 to Jim Salzman and J.B. Ruhl’s exploration of “presidential 
exit” not only from prior presidential actions, but from statutory 
commitments.5  
We approach the theme of exit from the other direction: 
limitations on exit, especially those that are tied to voting and 
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citizenship. What of “judicially forbidden exit”? What bonds can the 
government not break? 
To us, a fascinating test case is Puerto Rico—what Fuentes-
Rohwer has called “the land that democratic theory forgot.”6 The evils 
that the VRA was designed to address seem mild in comparison to the 
situation on the island, where people cannot vote at all in Presidential 
elections.7 Perhaps to the surprise of many Americans on the mainland, 
though, Puerto Ricans are American citizens, and have been for more 
than a century. The precise incidents of that citizenship are still, even a 
century later, murky.8 But it is undeniable that Puerto Ricans have 
some kind of status in the American legal system that they did not have 
when the island was originally acquired in the 1800s. 
As for the island itself, its legal status is also dubious. Indeed, 
many scholars have noted the ways in which the island’s second-class 
status lays a foundation for the second-class citizenship of its residents.9 
Puerto Rico is not a state, but it is not a foreign country. It is, in the 
words of the Supreme Court, “foreign in a domestic sense”10—a so-
called “unincorporated territory.” That classification has implications 
not only for the past and present treatment of the island, but also for 
its future. 
Perhaps most ominously, prominent scholars have suggested that 
Puerto Rico’s status leaves open the possibility that the island might be 
“de-annexed”—expelled—from the remainder of the United States.11 
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We have written elsewhere about the question of what international 
and domestic law have to say about the expulsion of former colonies 
generally12 and Puerto Rico in particular.13 
The question motivating this paper is different, but builds on the 
expulsion possibility, considering it in light of the connection between 
citizenship and the island’s status. We ask: What happens to citizenship 
rights if Congress decides it is time to give Puerto Rico “independence” 
against its will? More broadly, we are probing the tension between a 
strong individual right (citizenship) and a potentially weak collective 
right (the right of Puerto Rico to remain part of the United States, 
which is arguably revocable by Congress on a whim).14 We argue that 
the strong citizenship rights enjoyed by Puerto Ricans today—granted 
by statute, and solidified by nearly a century of historical practice—are 
not compatible with an unrestrained power of Congress to expel the 
island. 
The next natural question is which of the two propositions must 
give way: Do Puerto Ricans lose whatever citizenship rights they have, 
or does Congress lose whatever expulsion power it has? We argue that 
Puerto Rican citizenship effectively trumps, in legal and practical 
terms, any congressional power of expulsion. 
If we are right, there could be significant implications, in particular 
for the continuing viability of the Insular Cases—the Supreme Court 
decisions that created the category of “unincorporated territory” and 
relegated Puerto Rico to it. In effect, Puerto Rican citizenship provides 
strong evidence that, to quote language from later Supreme Court 
cases, “over time the ties between the United States and any of its 
unincorporated territories” have “strengthen[ed] in ways that are of 
constitutional significance.”15 
I.  PUERTO RICAN CITIZENSHIP AND PUERTO RICO’S 
STATUS HAVE ALWAYS BEEN LINKED 
To determine how the US citizenship of Puerto Ricans and Puerto 
Rico’s political status within the US might interact to change Puerto 
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Rico’s current status, it is helpful to know how the two features began, 
and how they are related. 
Puerto Rican citizenship has been disadvantaged ever since the 
island was acquired by the United States following the Spanish-
American War. The United States had acquired inhabited territories 
by treaty in the past—the Louisiana Purchase being the most obvious 
example—and had always made provision for the citizenship of the 
people and the eventual statehood of the area.16 That was not the case 
for Puerto Rico. Although Puerto Ricans had been entitled to some 
citizenship rights under the Spanish,17 Article IX of the Treaty of Paris 
took away those rights without correspondingly guaranteeing U.S. 
citizenship. Instead, Congress was given power to “determine[]” their 
“civil rights and political status.”18 From the outset, then, the legal 
status of the island and its inhabitants was unclear. That limbo, and a 
political moment that focused attention on the question of American 
empire, generated an incredible outpouring of public discussion19 and 
legal scholarship.20 
It also generated legislation. In 1900, Congress passed the Foraker 
Act,21 whose sponsor said it was designed “to recognize that Puerto 
Rico belongs to the United States of America.”22 The Act not only 
denied statehood to Puerto Rico, but disadvantaged it even vis-à-vis 
other territories. As Christina Duffy Ponsa-Kraus notes: 
 [M]ost significantly, Congress had declined to extend 
the US Constitution by statute to Puerto Rico, as it had 
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done in all prior territories. Moreover, instead of 
granting US citizenship to the island’s inhabitants, it 
declared native-born Puerto Ricans ‘citizens of Porto 
Rico,’ a nebulous and undefined status that amounted 
to little more than an embellished form of 
statelessness.23 
The citizenship limbo permitted by the Treaty of Paris and 
established by the Foraker Act would later be echoed by the Supreme 
Court in the Insular Cases, which confronted the question of the 
island’s legal status vis-à-vis the United States. That question has been 
addressed elsewhere, and—despite general neglect in the legal 
academy—fortunately has attracted increasing attention in recent 
years.24 The Court’s answer was, to put it mildly, not entirely 
satisfactory. In brief, the Justices concluded that Puerto Rico was an 
“unincorporated territory”—a novel category with an odd relationship 
to the mainland. U.S. territories, of course, had existed before, and all 
of them had eventually been made into states. But unincorporated 
territories lacked that constitutional trajectory, leaving serious 
questions about what they can demand or reject.  
Most relevantly for this symposium’s theme of “exit,” eminent 
jurists have found evidence suggesting that the Insular Cases were 
written to preserve the United States’ option to expel Puerto Rico.25 
Judge José  Cabranes writes, “the doctrine seemed to leave open the 
possibility that, for one reason or another, the United States might 
‘dispose’ of its insular territories.”26 Legal historian Christina Duffy 
Ponsa-Kraus documents the evidence supporting this argument at 
length in her article, “Untied States: American Expansion and 
Territorial Deannexation.”27 
These statutes and Supreme Court decisions put the island, as a 
political entity, and its people, as political actors, in limbo. Individual 
citizenship and territorial status were both sorted into novel and, within 
our legal system, unique categories. But they were also linked in law 
and practice, even though, technically speaking, they need not be 
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completely coincidental. There is no conceptual need for citizenship 
and territorial status to rise or fall together. It is easy enough to imagine 
American citizens living on non-state or even non-American soil. 
That’s what expatriates do. Nor is it inconceivable to imagine the 
creation of a new state whose residents would not immediately and 
automatically become citizens. But as a practical matter, there is 
something bizarre about the notion that something as strong, integral, 
and constitutionally significant as citizenship is revocable by Congress 
with no consent of the individual. More concretely, it would be 
laughable to think that Congress could strip the hypothetical John 
Paulson, who resides somewhere between Aspen and New York, of 
this citizenship for no reason (indeed, it might not be possible to do so 
for most, and maybe all, reasons).28 Yet, if John is a Puerto Rican living 
in Puerto Rico, which is also US soil, he can be stripped of his 
citizenship on a whim of Congress?  Surely not. If that is the case: What 
follows?  
As a matter of US law and practice, citizenship and territorial 
status are deeply intertwined, as political leaders in Puerto Rico have 
long recognized. Even in 1916, Puerto Rico’s resident commissioner, 
Luis Muñoz Rivera, spoke for many when he said: “Give us statehood 
and your glorious citizenship will be welcome to us and to our children. 
If you deny us statehood, we decline your citizenship, frankly, proudly, 
as befits a people who … will preserve their conception of honor, which 
none can take from them . . . .”29  
Notably, that same year, the Jones Act of 1916 pledged eventual 
independence to the Philippines30—a promise that was fulfilled in 
1946.31 That independence can be explained in part by the fact that the 
Filipinos fought hard for it.32 But it might also have to do with the fact 
that the territory had become expensive for the mainland, especially as 
more and more relatively poor Filipinos migrated to the US 
mainland.33 And that, in turn, may help explain why, in addition to 
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independence for the Philippines, the relevant treaty also stripped 
Filipinos of their nationality.34 Back then, we imagine no one blinked 
an eyelid at the fact that the hypothetical John Paulsons from New 
York, who happened to be living in Manila at the time, would get to 
retain their US citizenship. 
As for Puerto Rico, the deal proposed by Rivera and other 
political leaders—citizenship only with statehood to accompany it—
was effectively declined. In 1917, another Jones Act conferred 
American citizenship on Puerto Ricans.35 But as Cabranes notes, “the 
citizenship that was granted was not complete,” and the “very word 
‘citizenship’ suggested equality of rights and privileges and full 
membership in the American political community, thereby obscuring 
the colonial relationship between a great metropolitan state and a poor 
overseas dependency.”36 Cabranes concludes that “[b]y extending 
United States citizenship to the Puerto Ricans after promising 
independence to the Filipinos, Congress intended to do little more than 
proclaim the permanence of Puerto Rico’s political links with the 
United States.”37  
Some, however, interpreted the signals differently, and thought 
that statehood would follow citizenship. As a former governor of 
Puerto Rico put it, an “implied pledge of statehood [was] made to 
Puerto Ricans when citizenship was granted.”38 He was not alone. It 
was “widely believed that it would only be a matter of time until this 
‘transitory phase’ would end in statehood.”39  
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of service members. See Landess Kearns, Military Veterans Living in US Territories Sue for Right 
to Vote, HUFFINGTON POST, Nov. 19, 2015, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/veterans-us-
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Has that time finally come? 
II.  IS PUERTO RICAN CITIZENSHIP CONSISTENT WITH A 
CONGRESSIONAL POWER OF EXPULSION? 
The Territories Clause undoubtedly gives Congress great power 
over the territories. When it comes to uninhabited territories, that 
power might well include the power to cede or transfer. But that does 
not necessarily mean that Puerto Rico—inhabited by millions of US 
citizens—is subject to the same plenary power.40 When an enumerated 
congressional power runs into a rights-based limitation, it must yield.41 
And it follows that if Puerto Rican citizenship (a right) is inconsistent 
with the power to expel (a power), then the latter gives way.  
To take one example, we think it clear that the Equal Protection 
Clause would prevent Congress from expelling Puerto Rico from the 
United States because of racially discriminatory animus and with the 
goal of harming the overwhelmingly Hispanic citizens of the island. 
Racial animus directed at American citizens is the bête noir of Equal 
Protection, after all.42 The same would of course be true of any effort 
to strip them of citizenship on that basis. (For that reason, among 
others, we suspect that the US treatment of the Filipinos’ nationality in 
the wake of the Philippines independence would not pass 
constitutional muster today.) 
One might take the fallback position that Puerto Rican citizenship 
is simply a matter of statutory grace (if it is a constitutional imperative 
then the answers are even more clear43), but that would not necessarily 
avoid an Equal Protection challenge. If anything, it would compound 
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the problem, since the citizenship statutes themselves were infected 
with racial bias.44 The Supreme Court in Downes v. Bidwell suggested 
as much: “Indeed, it is doubtful if Congress would ever assent to 
annexation of territory upon the condition that its inhabitants, however 
foreign they may be to our habits, traditions and modes of life, shall 
become at once citizens of the United States.”45 
Of course, Downes says “at once,” and the argument is not that 
Puerto Ricans became citizens at the moment the island was annexed. 
The argument, instead, is that the citizenship that has been given may 
not so simply be taken away. Perhaps for this very reason, discussions 
of Puerto Rican citizenship in the wake of severance typically consider 
the possibility that Puerto Ricans would have the option to retain their 
US citizenship—to become, in effect, an island of ex-patriates. 
Contemplating the end of US sovereignty and citizenship in Puerto 
Rico, Dick Thornburgh—the former Attorney General and 
Republican politician who has consistently supported self-
determination for the island46—concludes: 
History and U.S. law show that U.S. citizenship will 
end in one of two ways. When the independent nation 
of the Philippines succeeded the Philippines 
commonwealth, U.S. nationality and territorial 
citizenship for persons who acquired it based on birth 
in the territory ended and all persons so situated 
became aliens under U.S. law. Those residing in the 
United States were repatriated to their homeland in the 
new republic of the Philippines, except for those who 
met residency requirements in the states of the Union 
and thereby were permitted by Congress to become 
candidates for naturalization. The other option, 
exemplified by in the case of the succession from 
Spanish to U.S. sovereignty, provides for an election of 
allegiance to be allowed, requiring a choice of 
nationalities but not allowing dual nationality to be 
created by U.S. law or as part of the succession 
process.47 
 
 44. Perea, supra note 16, at 140, 156. See, e.g., Baldwin, supra note 20, at 415 (arguing against 
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 45. 182 U.S. 244, 279–80 (1901).  
 46. See generally DICK THORNBURGH, PUERTO RICO’S FUTURE: A TIME TO Decide (2007). 
 47. Richard Thornburgh, Puerto Rican Separatism and United States Federalism, in FOREIGN 
IN A DOMESTIC SENSE, supra note 10, at 349, 350. 
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Would the second of these options—which seems to be the 
overwhelming preference—solve all of the problems described here? 
As far as citizenship is concerned, it would. But that simply reinforces 
the conclusion that citizenship is non-negotiable.  
In Balzac v. Porto Rico, the Court effectively tried to draw a 
distinction between territory and citizenship, holding that the 1917 
grant of citizenship to the island’s inhabitants did not change their 
constitutional rights, so long as they remained residents of the island.48 
Chief Justice Taft concluded that the locality, and not their individual 
status as citizens, was what mattered.49 And he suggested that moving 
Puerto Rico out of unincorporated territory status would take 
something like an explicit act of Congress. But is that still true? 
III.  DE FACTO INCORPORATION 
There is reason to think that the latter point from Balzac is no 
longer good law. After all, the Supreme Court has held “[i]t may well 
be that over time the ties between the United States and any of its 
unincorporated Territories strengthen in ways that are of 
constitutional significance.”50 One federal district court has even held 
that Puerto Rico has now become an incorporated territory.51 We 
believe that Puerto Rican citizenship, and the corresponding limitation 
on Congress’s power to expel the island, is part of that story.  
Recall that, on one predominant reading, the category of 
“unincorporated territories” was created precisely so as to preserve 
Congress’s power to expel those territories. What differentiates them 
from incorporated territories, then, is that they are subject to such a 
power. If Puerto Rico is an unincorporated territory because it can be 
expelled, then if it cannot be expelled it is not an unincorporated 
territory. As we have shown, Puerto Rican citizenship means that the 
island cannot be expelled. It follows that Puerto Rico cannot be an 
unincorporated territory. 
This would not mean that Puerto Rico should immediately 
become a state. Instead, it would become an incorporated territory—a 
step out of limbo, and toward either statehood or independence.  
 
 48. 258 U.S. 298, 309 (1922). 
 49. Id. at 309. 
 50. Boumediene v. Bush, 533 U.S. 723, 758 (2008).  
 51. Consejo de Salud Playa de Ponce v. Rullan, 586 F. Supp. 2d 22, 41 (D.P.R. 2008), as 
corrected (Nov. 10, 2008) (“Although Congress has never enacted any affirmative language such 
as ‘Puerto Rico is hereby an incorporated territory,’ its sequence of legislative actions from 1900 
to present has in fact incorporated the territory.”). 
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CONCLUSION 
The elephant in the room is race, just as it is for Charles and 
Fuentes Rohwer in their discussion of the Voting Rights Act. In the 
early 1900s, we suspect that the grant of citizenship of individual Puerto 
Ricans while keeping the option to expel their territory (and them) was 
seen as acceptable because it was perfectly conceivable to judges and 
politicians that, when the time came, those who were “Puerto Ricans” 
and those who were “Americans” could be identified and separated on 
the basis of race. In the event of expulsion, the latter presumably would 
be given the option to retain their US citizenship; whereas the former 
would not.  
This seems to be what happened around the world when the 
imperial powers retreated from their colonies. And the political and 
economic arguments for it are easy enough to perceive. Given that the 
colonies were invariably significantly poorer than the ruling 
metropolis, too many from the colonies – on pure economic grounds – 
would have taken the option to keep that extra passport. 
But things have changed (we hope), at least as a matter of US 
constitutional law. Congress could not say to our hypothetical John 
Paulson, living in his mansion on the Puerto Rican mainland, “You get 
to keep your US passport, and vote in Connecticut elections at our 
local embassy in San Juan in the future,” while telling his neighbor, 
Daniel Morales, “You finally get the right of independence that we 
know you always wanted. Bye bye and good luck.” 
 
